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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the death penalty, 
whether or not cruel, has most certainly been unusual in the annals of 
criminal punishment. In just four years, the Court foreclosed this form 
of punishment in Furman v. Georgia and then reopened it as a possibil-
ity in Gregg v. Georgia.1 One year later, the Court categorically ex-
cluded the punishment for the rape of an adult.2 Five years later, the 
Court again precluded the punishment for any defendant convicted of 
felony-murder who did not participate or share in the homicidal act or 
intent.3 In 1986, in Ford v. Wainwright,4 the Court would struggle with 
the Orwellian issue of whether and how competent a person must be 
to be executed. In 1989, in two cases decided on the same day, the Court 
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1.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2.  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
3.  Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
4.  477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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refused to find that the “mentally retarded” or juveniles were categor-
ically exempt from the death penalty in opinions that both embodied 
the “national consensus”5 test for death penalty restrictions and ques-
tioned its exclusivity as the determinate measure of cruel and unusual 
punishment.6 
In the decade that followed, the ground began to shift under the 
Court’s jurisprudence in a number of ways. Coalitions opposed to the 
death penalty expanded to encompass international human rights ad-
vocates, dedicated as amicus curiae or pro bono counsel. This coalition 
highlighted in its advocacy the United States’ growing isolation in its 
official acceptance of the punishment.7 The 2002 landmark case of At-
kins v. Virginia invigorated categorical exclusions from the death pen-
alty, recognizing that the “mentally retarded” could not be subject to 
the harshest form of punishment.8 Roper v. Simmons added juvenile 
offenders to the categorical exclusions.9 In 2008, rape of a child when 
the crime did not result and was not intended to result in the victim’s 
death was also excluded.10 In the four years after Roper, the Court 
would protect juvenile offenders from life without parole, first for non-
homicidal offenses,11 then for any offense.12 The Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana decision on January 25, 2016 applied the prohibition on life without 
parole for juvenile offenders retroactively, releasing prisoners who had 
spent their entire “adult” lives behind bars.13 
In addition, the Court found itself mired after Furman in what one 
commentator described as “an unparalleled level of constitutional mi-
cromanagement” as to how the death penalty can be imposed proce-
durally and when it can be imposed based on the nature of the offense 
and the status of the offender.14 In the October 2015 term alone, the 
Court granted certiorari in a consolidated trio of cases and an addi-
tional case raising such procedural issues.15 
 
 5.  See infra notes 59–62, 69–76, and 127–151. Generally, the test measures what is cruel and 
unusual by how many states have banned or permitted a certain punishment. 
 6.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 7. See infra notes 162–163 and accompanying text.  
 8.  536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 9.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 10.  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 11.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 12.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 13. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 14. Scott E. Sundby, The True Legacy of Atkins and Roper: the Unreliability Principle, Men-
tally Ill Defendants, and the Death Penalty’s Unraveling, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 487, 489 
(2014).  
 15.  See generally Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Docket Loaded with Death-Penalty Cases , 
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Against this backdrop, the Court’s 2015 decision in Glossip v. Gross 
seems a notable victory for the death penalty.16 In the almost inevitable 
5-4 split, the Court refused to find that the specific method of execution, 
a three-drug protocol beginning with midazolam, constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment.17 The decision is at best a Pyrrhic victory for the 
death penalty, however, given the specificity of the method in question. 
More importantly, the majority opinion was largely eclipsed by Justice 
Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg, which called for total abo-
lition of the death penalty.18 The conflict evidenced by the dissenting 
opinion in Glossip shows the need for a “global realism”  recognizing 
that in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, consideration of interna-
tional legal norms and political realities is unavoidable. The method of 
execution itself necessarily resulted from foreign drug suppliers’ refusal 
to continue supplying drugs for execution purposes, and Justice 
Breyer’s dissent again brought to the forefront the United States’ iso-
lation in its acceptance of the death penalty.19 
Glossip v. Gross, thus, may be the beginning of the end of the death 
penalty, due to factors compelling the Supreme Court to hold that the 
death penalty is a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment. First, constitutional legal analysis has 
shifted steadily from the “national consensus”20 analysis to proportion-
ality and penological purposes served in Eighth Amendment cases. Sec-
ond, mounting empirical evidence shows no national consensus in favor 
of the death penalty. Third, there is a renewed recognition that decision-
making in capital cases is arbitrarily applied no matter what procedural 
 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (October 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-docket-
loaded-with-death-penalty-cases-1443999113. 
 16.  135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).  
 17. See id.  
 18. See id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 19. See infra notes 177–217 and accompanying text. As this article focuses on Breyer’s dissent 
as a roadmap for challenging the death penalty in the Supreme Court, it does not address the issue 
of the exorbitant costs of pursuing the death penalty compared to the benefits which has been the 
focus of much commentary. See, e.g., Adam Gershowitz, An NTSB for Capital Punishment, 47 
TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014) (“Certainly, as a matter of pure utility, the cost of capital 
punishment—arbitrariness, discrimination, and actual dollars spent—appears to be vastly greater 
than the benefits (primarily questionable claims of deterrence) it tangibly provides to society.”); 
see also id. at 153 n.17 (citing Corinna Barrett Lain, The Virtues of Thinking Small, 67 U. MIAMI 
L. REv. 397, 408–09 (2013) for explaining that cost was a factor in the decision of five states to 
repeal their death penalty statutes). See also Charles Blow, Eye-for-an-Eye Incivility, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 5, 2014, at A23 (quoting Professor Jeffrey A. Fagan that “[T]he price of obtaining convictions 
and executions ranges from $1.5 million to $5 million per case (in current dollars), compared to 
less than $1 million for each killer sentenced to life without parole.”). 
 20.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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prerequisites the Court imposes. Lastly, the significance of international 
norms and practices in determining “evolving standards of decency” 
under the Eighth Amendment is finally recognized. This recognition of 
the beginning of the end is explicit in Justice Breyer’s dissent and is also 
fundamental in evaluating Justice Kennedy’s position if confronted 
with a facial challenge notwithstanding his joining the majority in Glos-
sip v. Gross.21 As the quintessential swing vote of the nine Justice Court, 
Justice Kennedy’s vote on the issue is inevitably a focus for the pro-
spects of abolition of the death penalty. Given the current vacancy on 
the Court, this article will also address the potential outcome from a 
nine Justice Court with a newly appointed Justice.22 
I.  AN EMERGING ABOLITION COALITION ON THE COURT? 
It is routine to predict the future direction of Supreme Court opin-
ions in the current Supreme Court by the so-called swing vote of Justice 
Kennedy, even though the Court appears to have had more cohesive 
decisions under Chief Justice Roberts than in years past.23 That said, 
Justice Kennedy’s voting pattern since his appointment in 1988 in death 
penalty cases is illuminating as to his possible accord with Justice 
Breyer’s call for abolition of the death penalty as cruel and unusual 
 
 21. See 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 22. As this article was going to press, President Obama nominated Merrick B. Garland, 
Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, to fill Justice Scalia’s seat, but many Republican 
Senators in Congress denied that he would receive a confirmation hearing before the election. 
Enmarie Huetteman, Mikayla Bouchard, Josh Keller, & Larry Buchanan, Where Republican Sen-
ators Stand on the Supreme Court Nomination, N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 2016), http://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2016/03/21/us/politics/where-republican-senators-stand-on-the-supreme-
court-nomination.html?_r=0. As one purpose of this article is to analyze the death penalty under 
the Eighth Amendment without resorting to political labels or such categorizations of the Justices, 
it will only be noted that Judge Garland was the initial prosecutor in the Timothy McVeigh death 
penalty case, and in his 1995 confirmation hearing for the D.C. Circuit when asked about the 
death penalty said it was “settled law”: 
Senator SPECTER. Do you favor, as a personal matter, capital punishment?  
Mr. GARLAND. This is really a matter of settled law now. The Court has held that 
capital punishment is constitutional and lower courts are to follow that rule.  
Senator SPECTER. Well, I shall now push you on a direct response to my question. 
You are prepared to apply the law which supports capital punishment as a constitutional 
punishment?  
Mr. GARLAND. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I have been a prosecutor. As a prosecutor, I have 
recommended that the Government seek the death penalty. I don’t see any way in which 
my views would be inconsistent with the law in this area. 
Materials on file with author; see also Sarah Almukhtar, Why Obama Nominated Merrick Garland 
for the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (March 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2016/03/16/us/politics/garland-supreme-court-nomination.html 
 23. Neal K. Katyal, Law vs. Politics on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2014, at A23. 
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punishment.24 His authorship of all of the post-1989 opinions categori-
cally limiting the death penalty may indicate even more significantly 
the evolved coalition of Justices willing to abolish the death penalty, as 
opposed to the seeming triumph of the pro-death penalty outcome in 
Glossip v. Gross.25 
Before Justice Kennedy joined the Court, the Court found the im-
plementation of the death penalty unconstitutional in 1972 in Fur-
man,26 reinstated it with qualifications in 1976 in Gregg,27 and then in 
1977 prohibited its imposition for rape of an adult in Coker.28 Justice 
Kennedy had barely served a year on the Court before confronting two 
cases in which categorical exclusions from the penalty were unsuccess-
fully sought, and he joined in that result in 1989.29 As the junior Justice 
at that time, his departure from the accepted “national consensus” an-
alytical framework must have been striking, and just sixteen years 
later—a brief time by constitutional measure—both cases were over-
ruled with Justice Kennedy’s support.30 
In Penry v. Lynaugh the Supreme Court granted certiorari to an-
swer two questions: first, did Penry’s death sentence violate the Eighth 
Amendment because the jury was unable to consider mitigating evi-
dence in answering the special questions, and second, is it cruel and un-
usual punishment to execute a “mentally retarded” person of Penry’s 
capabilities?31The Court had previously determined in Teague v. Lane 
that relief that, if granted, would constitute a “new rule” cannot be an-
nounced or applied retroactively to a petitioner’s case, barring two ex-
ceptions.32 Although Teague was not a capital case, the Court deter-
mined both the general concept that new rules should not be retroac-
 
 24. See infra notes 69–176 and accompanying text.  
 25. See infra notes 77–94 and accompanying text.  
 26.  408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
 27.  428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
 28. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 29. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 30. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 31. 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989). 
 32. 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989). A “new rule” is one that imposes a new obligation on the gov-
ernment, one that was not dictated by precedent at the time of the initial trial’s conclusion. Id. 
The two exceptions were if the new rule placed certain primary private acts or conduct beyond 
the power of criminal law to proscribe, or if the new rule corrects an inaccuracy at trial that im-
plicated the fundamental fairness of the trial. Id. at 311–12. Neither exception applied to this as-
pect of Penry’s case, but the first exception was expanded in Part IV-A regarding Penry’s claim 
that the Eighth Amendment entirely barred the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at 329–
30. 
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tive and the specific exceptions that would allow retroactive applica-
tion to death penalty cases.33 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court then, examined if Penry’s 
request that his jury be required to consider any mitigating evidence 
before assigning the death penalty was a new rule under Teague.34 If so, 
the mitigating evidence could not be applied retroactively to Penry’s 
case on collateral appeal.35 The Court in 2016 would address the issue 
of whether the exclusion of a life sentence without parole for juveniles 
in Miller should be applied retroactively under Teague..36 The Court 
held that Penry had a constitutional guarantee that his jury must con-
sider any such mitigating evidence before passing a death sentence.37 
Therefore, Penry’s request was not for a new rule, but for Texas to fol-
low its extant constitutional obligation to ensure that the jury would 
consider all relevant mitigating evidence Penry may present during the 
sentencing in a capital case.38 
The Court then turned to Penry’s first issue: whether the special 
questions presented to the jury during the penalty phase of his trial vi-
olated his constitutional rights by leaving the jury unable to properly 
consider mitigating evidence when contemplating the death penalty.39 
The Court reiterated that Texas’s procedure is only constitutional if the 
special questions allow for consideration of mitigating factors,40 and 
that a sentencing party not only may consider mitigating evidence but 
must consider it in capital cases.41 The Court found the underlying legal 
reasoning for these rules was that “punishment should be directly re-
lated to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant,”42 and that 
 
 33. Id. at 313–14. 
 34. Id. at 314–19.  
 35. Id. at 314–19.  
 36.  136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (holding that Miller v. Alabama announced a new substantive con-
stitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review). 
 37. Penry, 489 U.S. at 328. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (holding that the 
sentencing party must consider all relevant mitigating evidence presented by the defense as a 
matter of law). See also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas’s death penalty 
statute under the Eighth Amendment, but guaranteeing that the special issues presented to the 
jury be interpreted broadly enough to allow the sentencing party to consider all relevant mitigat-
ing evidence presented by the defense); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that the 
defendant’s death sentence survived Jurek because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals inter-
preted the second special question constitutionally broadly, despite the question’s facial narrow-
ness). 
 38. Penry, 492 U.S. at 318–19. 
 39. Id. at 319–28. 
 40. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272. 
 41. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114–17. 
 42. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319. 
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“defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disad-
vantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be 
less culpable than defendants who have no excuse.”43 
Although the Court agreed with the state that Penry’s mental retar-
dation was relevant to the first special question—whether Penry had 
acted, or was capable of acting, deliberately—it also had great rele-
vance to Penry’s moral culpability for his crime, which is beyond the 
scope of the question.44 The state argued that, despite the narrowness 
of the special questions, the jurors were still free to vote their con-
science if they believed that there were mitigating factors which would 
lead them to be merciful to Penry, and in fact, the defense counsel urged 
the jury to do so in the interest of justice.45 Nevertheless, because the 
prosecution explicitly told the jury in rebuttal that the jurors had taken 
an oath to follow the law, and must follow their instructions as given, 
the Court found that “a reasonable juror could well have believed that 
there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve 
to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.”46 There-
fore, the Court concluded that Penry’s case should be remanded for 
resentencing to avoid the risk that the death penalty would be imposed 
in spite of factors that may call for something less severe.47 
The Court finally turned to Penry’s second issue on appeal: whether 
the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of a “mentally retarded” 
defendant.48 Because there was no established rule that the Eighth 
Amendment prevented the execution of the “mentally retarded” at the 
time of Penry’s conviction, the Court held that this would constitute a 
“new rule” under Teague.49 However, the first exception to Teague is 
that a new rule may be retroactive on collateral appeal if it placed “pri-
mary conduct” of the petitioner beyond the scope of criminal law.50 In 
the Court’s view, “a new rule placing a certain class of individuals be-
yond the State’s power to punish by death is analogous to a new rule 
 
 43. Id. (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)). 
 44. Id. at 323. The court also considered Penry’s retardation with respect to the other special 
questions, but found that it had no relevance to the third question, as to whether Penry’s acts were 
unreasonable, and could actually be an aggravating factor for the second question, as Penry’s 
inability to learn from his mistakes could make it more likely a jury would see Penry as a future 
violent threat to society. Id. at 323–25. 
 45. Id. at 325. 
 46. Id. at 325–26. 
 47. Id. at 328. 
 48. Id. at 330–35. 
 49. Id. at 329. 
 50. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989). 
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placing certain conduct beyond the State’s power to punish at all.”51 
Therefore, the Court expanded this exception to Teague’s general pro-
hibition against retroactivity to encompass “rules prohibiting a certain 
category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status 
or offense.”52 The Court reiterated that the Eighth Amendment prohib-
ited at a minimum punishments considered cruel and unusual in the 
English common law at the time the Amendment was adopted, but was 
not limited to practices condemned by the common law in 1789.53 
Generally, the common law prohibited punishment of “idiots” and 
“lunatics” for crimes committed due to their disabilities.54 This prohibi-
tion was the precursor to the modern insanity defense.55 “Idiot” had no 
standardized definition at common law, but “was generally used to de-
scribe persons who had a total lack of reason or understanding, or an 
inability to distinguish between good and evil.”56 The Court found 
some similarities between the common law definition of an “idiot” who 
could not be punished for his crimes, and the modern view of mental 
retardation; however, the Court saw the common law definition as ap-
plying to people “wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of their actions,” which is more analogous to someone with “se-
vere” or “profound” retardation rather than someone of Penry’s capac-
ity.57 Penry’s insanity defense was rejected and he was found competent 
to stand trial. 
In addition, unlike what the Court found with regard to the insane, 
for whom there was a national consensus against execution,58 only two 
states had statutes against executing the mentally retarded for capital 
crimes, one of which had yet to go into effect.59 Even taking into ac-
count the fourteen states prohibiting capital punishment altogether, the 
Court found no national consensus against executing the mentally re-
tarded that would justify expanding the common law definition of cruel 
 
 51. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)). 
 54. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331–32. 
 55. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331–32. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 332–33. The Court’s reasoning here implies that the Eighth Amendment would 
categorically prohibit the execution of a defendant with an IQ of 40 or lower, as “severely” re-
tarded and thus similar enough to the common law definition of idiocy. Id. at 318–19. 
 58. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 399. 
 59. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333–34. 
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and unusual punishment.60 Although there was polling indicating wide-
spread public opposition to executing the “mentally retarded”, this op-
position had not yet made its way into legislation, which the Court con-
sidered “an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which [it 
could] rely.”61 
Justice O’Connor considered the retribution theory of criminal 
punishment and its basis in proportion to the culpability of the offender 
with regards to mental retardation, which “has long been regarded as a 
factor that may diminish an individual’s culpability for a criminal act.”62 
However, O’Connor found she could not “conclude that all mentally 
retarded people of Penry’s ability—by virtue of their mental retarda-
tion alone, and apart from any individualized consideration of their per-
sonal responsibility—inevitably lack the . . . capacity to act with the de-
gree of culpability associated with the death penalty,” and that mental 
retardation was better viewed as a mitigating factor in capital sentenc-
ing than an absolute bar.63 
The Fifth Circuit’s judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in 
part, and remanded to the trial court for sentencing procedures that 
would allow Penry to present evidence of his mental retardation and 
history of abuse as mitigating factors against sentencing him to death.64 
However, the Court found no absolute Eighth Amendment protection 
against the execution of the mentally retarded.65 Instead, the Court 
viewed that common law ban as applicable to only those considered 
“severely” or “profoundly” retarded, with an IQ of 40 or below.66 On 
this second issue, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, with Bren-
nan noting that the punishment was unconstitutional under both a pro-
portionality analysis weighing the gravity of the offense with the harsh-
ness of the penalty, and as failing to further the penal goals of deter-
rence or retribution.67 
It is impossible to view the Court’s references to “idiots,” “lunatics,” 
and the “mentally retarded,” however historically justified, without rec-
ognizing that public and scientific understanding of intellectual disabil-
 
 60. Id. at 334. 
 61. Id. at 335. 
 62. Id. at 335–37. 
 63. Id. at 338. 
 64. Id. at 340. 
 65. Id. at 339–40. 
 66. Id. at 339–40. 
 67. Id. at 343–49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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ities and mental illness have changed dramatically as part of the na-
tional consensus (although it would be 2014 before Justice Kennedy 
would substitute “intellectually disabled” for the earlier label of “men-
tal retardation”).68 In a 1989 case decided the same day as Penry, Justice 
Kennedy joined Justice Scalia’s opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky that the 
death penalty was not cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles over 
15 but under 18 at the time of the crime.69 Although Justice Scalia would 
have started and ended the analysis with what punishment was allowed 
by the national consensus of states,70 Justice O’Connor separately con-
curred in the lack of consensus and ultimately the judgment, concluding 
that the Court should have conducted a proportionality analysis before 
reaching its conclusion.71 
Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent by Justices Blackmun, Mar-
shall, and Stevens, took note of “what Justice Scalia calls, with evident 
but misplaced disdain, ‘ethicoscientific’ evidence” to determine 
whether the punishment was disproportionate or served no legitimate 
penal goal.72 The dissent goes on to cite as relevant that “within the 
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile 
crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved.”73 Stanford v. Ken-
tucky,74 along with the 1988 certiorari application in High v. Zant,75 
would mark the start of a committed campaign of international human 
rights advocates to bring international and comparative law norms to 
the attention of the Court in the context of the death penalty. 
 
 68. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1989 (2014). 
 69. See 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 70. See 492 U.S. 361, 364–380 (Scalia, J.) (1989).  
 71. Id. at 381 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 390. “Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, An-
nex to G.A.Res. 2200, 21 U.N.GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 16) 53, U.N.Doc. A/6316 (1966) (signed 
but not ratified by the United States), reprinted in 6 INT’L LEGAL MATERIAL 368, 370 (1967); 
Article 4(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser. 
K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970) (same), reprinted in 9 INT’L LEGAL MATERIAL 673, 
676 (1970); Article 68 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 (ratified by the United States). 
See also Resolutions and Decisions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Res.1984/50, U.N.ESCOR Supp. (No. 1), p. 33, U.N.Doc. E/1984/84 (1984) (adopting “safeguards 
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty,” including the safeguard 
that “[p]ersons below 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be 
sentenced to death”), endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, U.N.GAOR Res. 
39/118, U.N.Doc. A/39/51, p. 211, ¶¶ 2, 5 (1985), and adopted by the Seventh United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, p. 83, U.N.Doc. A/Conf. 
121/22, U.N. Sales No. E.86.IV.1 (1986).” Id. at 390 n.10. 
 74.  See 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 75.  On file with the journal. 
MALONE (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2016  9:59 AM 
2016] THE DEATH KNELL FOR THE DEATH PENALTY 117 
In 2002, Justice Stevens, as senior Justice in the majority, would 
write the opinion in Atkins v. Virginia overruling Penry and prohibiting 
imposition of the death penalty on the mentally disabled.76 Three years 
later, Justice Stevens would assign Roper v. Simmons77 to Justice Ken-
nedy, for the opinion which would overrule Stanford v. Kentucky78 and 
prohibit the death penalty for juveniles over the age of 15 but under 18 
when the capital crime was committed.79 In that opinion, Justice Ken-
nedy would write at the outset that the Atkins decision “returned to the 
rule, established in decisions predating Stanford, that ‘the Constitution 
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear 
on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the 
Eighth Amendment.’”80 Ironically, the petitioner in Roper argued that 
there was no national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles 
based in part on the United States’ ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with a reservation to preserve 
capital punishment for juveniles.81 The opinion found that to be only 
“faint support,” particularly when considered with subsequent Con-
gressional legislation abolishing the punishment for federal crimes 
committed by juveniles.82 
In addition to finding a state consensus against the death penalty’s 
imposition, the Roper opinion predominantly focused on the “unrelia-
bility” of juveniles being classified among the worst offenders, and con-
comitantly the failure of the death penalty to serve any penological jus-
tification for juvenile offenders.83 Most significantly from the perspec-
tive of global realism, Part IV of the opinion focuses on the “reality” of 
 
 76. See 536 U.S. 304 (2002). As often seems to be the case, even those decisions which garner 
the most public attention when decided, disappear from the public domain of discussion with 
respect to their individual outcomes. What happens after many of the Supreme Court death pen-
alty decisions also indicates that the death penalty system is arbitrary and fatally flawed. Atkins 
is one such example, which highlights the inability of juries to give the objective, individual con-
sideration to mitigating circumstances required by the Court’s decisions. On remand, the jury 
would again find that Atkins was intellectually disabled. Atkins was spared the death penalty due 
to the judge’s determination that the evidence that Atkins was the triggerman was obtained by 
prosecutorial misconduct. See Mark E. Olive, The Daryl Atkins Story, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 363 (2014). Twelve years after Atkins, the Court would decide in Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 
(2014) that an IQ cutoff of 70 for intellectual disability precluded the individual assessment con-
stitutionally required. Other examples are included in the notes that follow for the principal cases.  
 77.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 78.  492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 79.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 80. Id. at 563. 
 81. Id. at 567. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. 
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the United States being the only country that gave “official sanction” 
to the juvenile death penalty.84 Only the United States and Somalia had 
not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which pro-
hibits the penalty, and Somalia had not executed a juvenile offender 
since before 1990.85 From this Justice Kennedy concludes: 
It is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of inter-
national opinion against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large 
part on the understanding that the instability and emotional imbal-
ance of young people may often be a factor in the crime. See Brief 
for Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et 
al. as Amici Curiae 10–11. The opinion of the world community, 
while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and sig-
nificant confirmation for our own conclusions. It does not lessen our 
fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge 
that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other 
nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same 
rights within our own heritage of freedom.86 
Justice Kennedy would go on to write the majority opinions in Pan-
etti v. Quarterman,87 Kennedy v. Louisiana,88 Graham v. Florida,89 Hall 
v. Florida,90 and Montgomery v. Louisiana.91 Justice Kennedy would 
also be in the majority in Miller v. Alabama, which held there should be 
no life without parole sentence for juveniles92 and Brumfield v. Cain, 
which required hearing prerequisites on intellectual disabilities,93 writ-
ten by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor respectively. For both Miller and 
Brumfield, Justice Kennedy would have assigned the two junior Jus-
tices to those opinions as Senior Justice in the majority. 94 In the five 
 
 84. Id. at 575. 
 85. Id. at 576. 
 86. Id. at 578. 
 87. 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (holding that prisoner’s documented delusions were constitutionally 
required to be considered in determining whether he was competent to be executed, as explained 
in Ford). 
 88. 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that punishing a crime of child rape with the death penalty 
violates the Eighth Amendment).  
 89. 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of life with-
out parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide). 
 90. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (holding that state rule violated the Eighth Amendment because 
it foreclosed further investigation of a capital defendant’s intellectual disability if his IQ score was 
more than 70 and created unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability would be ex-
ecuted). 
 91. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (holding that Miller v. Alabama announced a new substantive con-
stitutional rule that was retroactive on state collateral review). 
 92. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 93. 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015).  
 94. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 153 (3d ed. 1989). 
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opinions authored by Justice Kennedy, several threads of normative 
analysis emerge consistently. These norms are best illustrated in Panetti, 
Hall, and most recently Montgomery v. Louisiana. 
The Court as a procedural matter had to address Panetti’s conten-
tion that Ford,95 along with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
entitled him to certain procedures in his sentencing hearing unconsti-
tutionally denied to him by the state of Texas.96 The Court agreed that 
after a defendant makes a “substantial showing of incompetency,” Ford 
entitles him to “among other things, an adequate means by which to 
submit expert psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence that had 
been solicited by the state court.”97 
The Ford standard does not specify exact procedures for the state 
to follow, but requires a “fair hearing” on the issue of the petitioner’s 
competency, one in which the petitioner has an opportunity to be heard 
and whose ultimate evaluation is based on more than the findings of 
psychiatrists appointed by the state.98 The Court found that for Pan-
etti’s case, the state was deficient in its procedures due to a lack of ad-
equate recordkeeping, a failure to keep Panetti and his counsel in-
formed throughout the proceedings, a failure to provide a competency 
hearing, and a failure to allow Panetti to submit any evidence in re-
sponse to the court-appointed psychiatrists’ evaluations.99 
The Court did not rule on whether Ford requires specific proce-
dures such as the opportunity for discovery or ability to cross-examine 
witnesses.100 Instead, the Court found that Texas’s procedure regarding 
Panetti was so clearly deficient in other ways as to render further ques-
tions unnecessary.101 Citing to Ford, the Court held that it did not need 
to defer to the state court’s finding of competency because Texas’s pro-
cedure was inadequate for ascertaining the truth at trial.102 
The Court then turned to Panetti’s question as to whether the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of a prisoner whose men-
tal illness deprived him of the capacity to understand he is being exe-
cuted as a punishment for a crime.103 The Court looked to the record to 
 
 95. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 96. 551 U.S. 930, 935 (2007). 
 97. Id. at 948. 
 98. Id. at 949. 
 99. Id. at 950–51. 
 100. Id. at 952. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 954. 
 103. Id. 
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see what specific form Panetti’s illness took to determine if he was un-
able to be executed.104 
Four expert witnesses testified on Panetti’s behalf during the Dis-
trict Court proceedings.105 They explained that Panetti suffered from 
delusions related to his execution, such that he had mentally recast him-
self as a warrior for God after his sentence, with the state attempting to 
execute him to stop him from preaching.106 The state argued that Pan-
etti was still at times clear and lucid and could sufficiently understand 
the concept of his execution to be considered competent.107 
The Court of Appeals ultimately found Panetti competent via a 
three-part test based on the Court’s holding in Ford:108 first, that Panetti 
was aware he committed the murders; second, that Panetti was aware 
he would be executed; and third, that Panetti was aware that his crimes 
were the reason the state gave for his execution.109 The appeals court 
found that while Panetti’s delusions may have caused him to disbelieve 
the state’s reasons for executing him and to be unable to rationally un-
derstand them, his awareness of the state’s reasoning was sufficient.110 
The Court held that the appeals court’s standards were based on a 
misunderstanding of Ford that found a condemned prisoner’s delusions 
irrelevant for the purposes of determining comprehension or aware-
ness of his punishment.111 The Court instead looked to the Ford court’s 
justification for capital punishment for guidance, specifically that the 
interests of retribution are only served if the offender at last recognizes 
the gravity of his crime.112  This recognition would affirm for the surviv-
ing family and friends of the victim, and the community as a whole that 
the prisoner is sufficiently culpable for his crimes and that the ultimate 
punishment is justified.113 Thus, a prisoner who did not fully appreciate 
the reason for his punishment, and thus the severity of his crime, would 
call this motive for retribution into question.114 
 
 104. See id. at 954–56. 
 105. Id. at 954. 
 106. Id. at 954–55. 
 107. Id. at 955. 
 108. The Court based its test around its interpretation of Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ford, 
as the main opinion in the case was a plurality opinion, and Powell’s concurrence had the nar-
rower holding. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 420–27 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 109. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 956. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 956–58. 
 112. Id. at 958–59. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
MALONE (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2016  9:59 AM 
2016] THE DEATH KNELL FOR THE DEATH PENALTY 121 
The Court found no support in Ford or the common law for the idea 
that a prisoner could be denied the ability to demonstrate incompe-
tence merely because he could identify the stated reason for his execu-
tion.115 Instead, the Court held that Panetti’s stated delusions were so 
severe as to render his ability to comprehend the meaning and purpose 
of his punishment doubtful.116 Thus, the Ford test for competency must 
include an evaluation of the petitioner’s mental state with regard to any 
delusional beliefs he or she may have.117 Although the Court rejected 
the appeals court’s standard, it did not impose a specific rule to govern 
all competency determinations.118 It instead preferred to leave ques-
tions of that complexity unaddressed until the lower courts fully ad-
dressed the nature and severity of Panetti’s mental problems in a more 
definite manner and in light of all expert evidence.119 The Court re-
versed the appeals court’s judgment and remanded Panetti’s case for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.120 
In Kennedy,121 the Court considered the proportionality precedents 
established in Roper122 and Atkins,123 whereby diminished responsibil-
ity prevented application of the death penalty for homicide cases. Such 
 
 115. Id. at 959. The Court additionally recognized that the concept of “rational understand-
ing” was difficult to identify, and that one could argue many criminals will fail to understand why 
they are being punished for reasons other than mental illness, including extreme callousness to-
wards human life and the severity of their crimes or a level of self-centeredness that would prevent 
them from ever taking full responsibility for their actions. The Court distinguished Panetti’s case 
from these hypotheticals by specifying that the doubting of Panetti’s competence is not founded 
in “a misanthropic personality or an amoral character,” but a psychotic disorder. Id. at 960. 
 116. Id. at 960. 
 117. See id. (explaining that a competency test after Ford cannot treat delusional beliefs as 
irrelevant). 
 118. Id. at 960–61. 
 119. Id. at 961. 
 120. Id. at 962. Despite more than a thirty-year history of schizophrenia, the same trial judge 
found Panetti to be competent to be executed. His attorneys learned of his execution date from 
the newspapers because state officials said the law did not require them to provide his attorneys 
with notification. Editorial Board, Will Texas Kill an Insane Man?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2014, at 
A28. Hours before his scheduled execution in December 2014, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
granted a stay of execution. Panetti v. Stephens, No. 14-70037, 2014 WL 6779138 at *164 (5th Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2014) (per curiam). He remains on death row. See Johnathan Silver, Panetti Case High-
lights Cracks in Texas Execution Law, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.texastrib-
une.org/2015/10/20/panetti-case-highlights-possible-gap-execution-law/.  
Such last minute stays of execution are not just the stuff of movie plots. The first inmate to be put 
to death after the botched execution in Oklahoma also received a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stay two hours before his execution based on evidence of an IQ below 70. See Manny Fernandez 
and John Schwartz, Appeals Court Grants Stay of Execution in Texas Based on Mental Disability 
Claim, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at A14. 
 121. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008). 
 122. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 (2005). 
 123. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
MALONE (DO NOT DELETE) 9/23/2016  9:59 AM 
122 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 11:1&2 
sentences should only have been invoked for “a narrow category of the 
most serious crimes” and whose extreme culpability makes them “the 
most deserving of execution.”124 Kennedy reaffirmed that the propor-
tionality question is based upon “whether the death penalty is dispro-
portionate to the crime committed[, which] depends as well upon the 
standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own 
understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, his-
tory, meaning, and purpose.”125 
Nevertheless, the existence of objective indicia of consensus against 
making a crime punishable by death was acknowledged in the Eighth 
Amendment cases of Roper, Atkins, Coker, and Enmund.126 In each 
case, state statistics for imposing capital punishment were considered 
as indicia of consensus, which “weigh[ed] on the side of rejecting capital 
punishment for the crime.”127 
The Court acknowledged that while thirty-seven jurisdictions im-
pose the death penalty, only six of those jurisdictions authorized the 
death penalty for rape of a child.128 The Court further emphasized that 
while national consensus is not confined to tallying the number of 
states with applicable death penalty legislation, significantly, in 45 ju-
risdictions the petitioner could not be executed for the rape of a mi-
nor.129 
Overall, the Court held that “evidence of a national consensus with 
respect to the death penalty for child rapists, as with respect to juve-
niles, mentally retarded and vicarious felony offenders, shows divided 
opinion but, on balance, an opinion against imposing capital punish-
ment.”130 
Despite the Court’s acknowledgement that those who rape deserve 
serious punishment, it held that “in terms of moral depravity and of the 
injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, 
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.”131 As the pen-
alty for the rape of a minor was not addressed in Coker, the Court 
 
 124. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319). 
 125. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797–801 (1982); Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–600 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 426 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 793). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 427–28 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977)). 
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found “that there is no clear indication that state legislatures have mis-
interpreted Coker to hold that the death penalty for child rape is un-
constitutional.”132 The State argued that there was a consistent direc-
tion of change in support of the death penalty for child rape, reflected 
by six states where child rape is a capital offense, along with the states 
that have proposed but not yet enacted applicable death penalty legis-
lation.133 
The Court rejected such an argument as “it is not our practice, nor 
is it sound, to find contemporary norms based upon state legislation 
that has been proposed but not yet enacted.”134 Furthermore, as the 
change towards imposing capital punishment for rape of a minor is only 
evidenced by six new death penalty statutes, three enacted in the last 
two years, there “is not an indication of a trend or change in direction 
comparable to the one supported by data in Roper.”135 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion went on to note that execution statistics 
confirm social consensus against the death penalty for non-deadly child 
rape.136 The statistics show that, although nine states  permitted capital 
punishment for rape for some length of time after the Court’s 1972 de-
cision in Furman,137 Louisiana was the only state since 1964 that has 
sentenced an individual to death for the crime of child rape.138 Further-
more, no execution for any other non-homicide offense has been con-
ducted since 1963.139 As such, the Court concluded that the statistics 
provided show “a national consensus against capital punishment for 
the crime of child rape.”140 
Despite the opinion’s detailed scrutiny of whether there was a “na-
tional consensus” in either direction, Justice Kennedy’s opinion as-
serted that ultimately it was the Court’s own judgment which should be 
brought to bear on the death penalty’s constitutionality under the 
Eighth Amendment, not the consensus of the states.141 The Court noted 
 
 132. Id. at 431. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 433. 
 136. Id. at 433. 
 137. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the death penalty cannot be applied 
in a prejudiced manner). 
 138. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 434 (citing State v. Davis, No. 262,971 (1st Jud. Dist., Caddo Parish 
La. 2007), vacated per curiam, 995 So.2d 1211 (La. 2008)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 446. 
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the importance of confined implementation of the death penalty to en-
sure punishment is “exercised within the limits of civilized standards”142 
and structured so as to “prevent the penalty from being administered 
in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion.”143 In Enmund, the Court 
decided that the death penalty for the crime of vicarious felony murder 
is disproportionate to the offense,144 while Coker held capital punish-
ment to be “an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not 
take human life.”145 Thus, the Court found that it is not only the death 
penalty which is “unique in its severity and irrevocability,”146 but there 
is also a distinction between intentional first-degree murders on the 
one hand and non-homicide crimes against individual persons, includ-
ing child rape, on the other:147 
We have developed a foundational jurisprudence in the case of cap-
ital murder to guide the States and juries in imposing the death pen-
alty. Starting with Gregg, we have spent more than 32 years articu-
lating limiting factors that channel the jury’s discretion to avoid the 
death penalty’s arbitrary imposition in the case of capital murder. 
Though that practice remains sound, beginning the same process for 
crimes for which no one has been executed in more than 40 years 
would require experimentation in an area where a failed experiment 
would result in the execution of individuals undeserving of the 
death penalty.148 
The Court held that the fact there are more reported incidents of 
child rape than first-degree murder149 and that the 36 States that permit 
the death penalty could sentence to death all persons convicted of rap-
ing a child less than 12 years of age, could not be reconciled with our 
evolving standards of decency and the necessity to constrain the use of 
the death penalty.150 
The opinion concluded with its evaluation that the imposition of 
the death penalty for such crimes would serve no legitimate penologi-
cal purpose.151 Gregg152 instructed that capital punishment is excessive 
 
 142. Id. at 435 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958)). 
 143. Id. at 436 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987)).  
 144. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 145. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
 146. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 428 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 598). 
 147. Id. at 438. 
 148. Id. at 440–41. 
 149. Id. at 438. 
 150. Id. at 439. 
 151. See id. at 441–46 (concluding that retribution and deterrence do not justify the harshness 
of the death penalty in this type of case).  
 152. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the 
two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution 
and deterrence of capital crimes.153 Atkins154 noted that the goal of ret-
ribution reflects the interests of the victim and society in seeing that the 
offender is punished for the hurt he caused.155 In respect of Kennedy, 
the Court noted that it is not evident that the victim’s hurt is lessened 
when the law permits the death of the perpetrator.156 Furthermore, “en-
listing the child victim to assist it over the course of years in asking for 
capital punishment forces a moral choice on the child, who is not of 
mature age to make that choice.”157 Finally, the Court noted the prob-
lem of “unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony means 
there is a ‘special risk of wrongful execution’ in some child rape cases,” 
which would not fulfill any retributive value.158 
Rather than being a deterrent, the death penalty for non-deadly 
child rape may have the opposite effect by increasing the risk of non-
reporting of offences. “One of the most commonly cited reasons for 
nondisclosure is fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator, a 
concern that has special force where the abuser is a family member.”159 
In addition, a state that punishes child rape by death may remove an 
incentive for the rapist not to kill the victim.160 
The Court dismissed any concerns that its approach intruded upon 
the consensus-making process, as the Eighth Amendment is first and 
foremost defined by “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”161 Accordingly, the Court “becomes en-
meshed in the process, part judge and part the maker of that which it 
judges,” but that “the rule of evolving standards of decency with spe-
cific marks on the way to full progress and mature judgment means that 
resort to the penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes and lim-
ited in its instances of application.”162 
  
 
 153. Id. at 182. 
 154. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 155. Id. at 319. 
 156. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 442. 
 157. Id. at 443. 
 158. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321). 
 159. Id. at 445. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 446 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
 162. Id. at 446–47. 
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What emerges from Panetti and even more forcefully from Kennedy 
v. Louisiana is the reassertion of the Court’s primacy over state consen-
sus in determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
That this assertion of Court authority comes from Justice Kennedy, one 
of the current Justices most receptive to issues of state authority, takes 
the Eighth Amendment quite clearly outside of any explicit or implicit 
balancing of state and federal interests. In Panetti, the Court took juris-
diction of Panetti’s second habeas petition despite having rejected his 
first, found that Texas’ procedures for determining competency did not 
provide a “fair hearing” under Ford without even specifying what pro-
cedures such a fair hearing might require, and refused to defer to Texas’ 
determination of competency.163 
In Kennedy, after performing the obligatory assessment of national 
consensus, Justice Kennedy asserts that regardless of that determina-
tion, the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment for the cate-
gory of crime as disproportionate and served no legitimate purpose of 
criminal punishment.164 When Justice Kennedy points out that the 
Court has spent 32 years trying to individualize determinations of cap-
ital sentencing, resulting in “tension and imprecision,” and an approach 
which “might” be sound with respect to capital murder, the tone is al-
most one of exasperation in refusing to take that approach where death 
of the victim has not occurred.165 
On January 26, 2016, the Court decided in Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana166 that Miller’s167 prohibition of life without parole sentences for 
juveniles at the time of the crime applied retroactively as a substantive 
rule under Teague v. Lane.168 Montgomery, 17 years old when he killed 
a deputy sheriff then 69, had spent “almost his entire life” in prison.169 
The issue revolved around whether Miller’s pronouncement that the 
penalty was inappropriate except for crimes that “reflect permanent 
incorrigibility” was therefore only a procedural limitation on state sen-
tencing, or a substantive exclusion of a category of offenders.170 Recit-
ing proportionality analysis and lack of penological purpose from Mil-
ler, Justice Kennedy characterized Miller as a substantive, categorical 
 
 163. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
 164. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421. 
 165. Id. at 440–41.  
 166. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).  
 167.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 168. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct.at 736. 
 169. Id. at 726.  
 170. Id. at 734. 
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exclusion of a category of offenders based on status, as in Roper.171 
Finding no possibility of a “valid” (that is, reliable) result for such of-
fenders, the opinion added that “even the use of impeccable fact-find-
ing procedures could not legitimate a verdict” where “the conduct be-
ing penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment.”172 
The full implication of Kennedy’s opinion was certainly not lost on 
Justice Scalia: 
This whole exercise, this whole distortion of Miller, is just a devious 
way of eliminating life without parole for juvenile offenders. The 
Court might have done that expressly (as we know, the Court can 
decree anything) but that would have been something of an embar-
rassment. After all, one of the justifications the Court gave for de-
creeing an end to the death penalty for murders (no matter how 
many) committed by a juvenile was that life without parole was a 
severe enough punishment. How could the majority—in an opinion 
written by the very author of Roper—now say that punishment is also 
unconstitutional? The Court expressly refused to say so in Miller. So 
the Court refuses again today, but merely makes imposition of that 
severe sanction a practical impossibility. And then, in Godfather 
fashion, the majority makes states legislatures an offer they can’t 
refuse: Avoid all the utterly impossible nonsense we have prescribed 
by simply ‘permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be consider for 
parole. Mission accomplished.173 
 
This passage is Justice Scalia’s way of saying, “Et tu, Justice Ken-
nedy?” The reference to Justice Kennedy being the author of Roper 
harks back to Justice Scalia’s prediction in his dissent to Roper as to 
where that opinion might necessarily lead, unless, presumably, kept in 
check by its author, Justice Kennedy: 
 
Nor does the Court suggest a stopping point for its reasoning. If ju-
ries cannot make appropriate determinations in cases involving 
murderers under 18, in what other kind of cases will the Court find 
jurors deficient? We have already held that no jury may consider 
whether a mentally deficient defendant can receive the death pen-
alty, irrespective of his crime. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Why not 
take other mitigating factors, such as consideration of childhood 
 
 171. Id. at 734–35. 
 172. Id. at 730 (quoting United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 (1971)). 
 173. Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
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abuse or poverty, away from juries as well? Surely jurors “over-
power[ed]” by “the brutality or cold-blooded nature” of a crime, . . . 
could not adequately weigh these mitigating factors either.174 
As one authority on death penalty jurisprudence has noted, the At-
kins-Roper unreliability factors provide the potential of an overall chal-
lenge to the death penalty, by calling into question “the Court’s most 
fundamental post-Furman promise that reliability can be assured be-
cause jurors are able to give full individualized consideration to each 
defendant.”175 
II.  THE INEVITABILITY OF GLOBAL REALISM IN SUPREME COURT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A few months after Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer published The 
Court and the World: American Law and the New Global Realities.176 
The premise of the book is that the Supreme Court cannot avoid inter-
national law and practices in reaching its decisions.177 It deserves em-
phasis that Justice Breyer is not re-visiting the issue of actual applica-
tion of international law in U.S. law.178 That hot button topic (sparked 
in part by Justice Kennedy’s citation of foreign and international 
sources in Lawrence v. Texas179) is separate and distinct from the global 
reality (which this author refers to as global realism) that cases will in-
creasingly have international aspects and consequences, and refusing to 
consider the legal experiences of other states in addressing domestic 
legal issues abdicates judicial responsibility. For example, the brief for 
Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group in support of 
a pre-Roper juvenile defendant in High v. Zant,180 argued in the alter-
native that international standards informed the standards of decency 
to be met under the Eighth Amendment, and that international law 
prohibiting the execution of juveniles was binding on the United States 
as part of our domestic law.181 
  
 
 174. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 175.  Sundby, supra note 14, at 524–25.  
 176. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL REALITIES (Knopf  2015). 
 177. Id. at 7. 
 178. See generally id. at 4. 
 179. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 180. Standford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 181. Brief for International Human Rights Law Group as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners at 11, Standford, 492 U.S. 361 (No. 87-6026), 1988 WL 1026342.  
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As this author noted in 2003 shortly before Roper was decided, 
“The Supreme Court cannot avoid the internationalization of domestic 
law, as the five prominent international law cases on its docket this past 
term demonstrate.”182 Justice Breyer suggests that the interaction of 
judges and lawyers from different countries may be more influential 
than if or how other countries’ legal decisions are cited.183 In his book’s 
introduction, Justice Breyer states unequivocally that he believes “it 
important for Americans to understand and to appropriately apply in-
ternational and foreign law.”184 In a speech to the Appellate Judges Ed-
ucation Institute on November 12, 2015, he added that looking abroad 
to other similar institutions is necessary to “solve” major international 
problems such as the environment and security.185 
Most nations have abolished the death penalty. Of the 193 members 
of the United Nations, 95 have formally eliminated it while 42 others 
have ceased using it in practice.186 Furthermore, in 2013 only 22 coun-
tries carried out an execution and only 8 executed more than 10 peo-
ple.187 The nations included in the eight nations that regularly execute 
people are ones with which the United States does not typically try to 
align itself on human rights issues (China, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, So-
malia, Sudan, Yemen).188 In 2013 no execution took place in Europe or 
the Americas outside of the United States.189 
There has been continuing pressure in the international community 
to eradicate the death penalty. Beginning in 1989, the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted a protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights that laid out steps to abolish the death 
 
 182. Linda Malone, From Breard to Atkins to Malvo: Legal Incompetency and Human Rights 
Norms on the Fringes of the Death Penalty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 363, 412 (2004) (citing 
Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: The United States Constitution and Interna-
tional Law: Editor’s Introduction, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 42 n.3 (2004)). The five cases were Padilla 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005). 
 183. BREYER, supra note 176, at 7. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Nicholas Datlowe, Breyer: Court Must Look Abroad to Solve National, International 
Problems, 84 U.S.L. WK. 685 (2015). 
 186. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2775 (2015). 
 187. Id. at 2775–76. 
 188. Id. In 2010, the overwhelming majority of known executions took place in only five of 
these: China, Iran, North Korea, Yemen, and the United States. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2010 41 (2011). 
 189. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2776. 
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penalty.190 Since then, opposition has grown worldwide with the num-
ber of nations opposed to capital punishment doubling.191 In 2014, the 
General Assembly voted on a resolution by a vote of 117-37 (with 34 
abstentions) that called for a global moratorium on capital punish-
ment.192 This was the fifth time since 2007 that the General Assembly 
had voted on such a resolution, with opposition to the death penalty 
increasing over time.193 Just since 1989, 67 nations have abolished capi-
tal punishment.194 
Opposition to capital punishment has existed in Europe for many 
years. In 1962, a report to the Council of Europe revealed that “[a]n 
impartial glance at the facts clearly shows the death penalty [was] re-
garded in Europe as an anachronism.195 By 1994, twenty countries had 
ratified the Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which outlawed the death penalty in peacetime.196 Currently, all 
of Western Europe has abolished the death penalty.197 
In light of capital punishment’s rarity, the United States’ continued 
use of it has led to collateral consequences in the international commu-
nity due to potential violations of treaties to which the U.S. is a party. 
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(which the United States has ratified), local authorities are obligated to 
inform all detained foreigners “without delay” of their right to request 
consular notification of their detention and their right to demand an 
 
 190. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Aiming at Abolition of the Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414; U.N.G.A. 69/186, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/186 (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 191. Samuel Oakford, UN Vote Against Death Penalty Highlights Global Abolitionist Trend-
and Leaves the US Stranded, VICE NEWS (Dec. 19, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/un-vote-
against-death-penalty-highlights-global-abolitionist-trend-and-leaves-the-us-stranded. 
 192. U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., 73d plen. mtg. at 17–18, U.N. Doc. A/69/PV.73 (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 193. Oakford, supra note 191. 
 194. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries. 
 195. EUR. COMM. ON CRIME PROBLEMS, The Death Penalty in European Countries, 55 
(1962). 
 196. Eur. Consult. Ass., Report on the Abolition of Capital Punishment, Doc. No. 7154 (1994). 
 197. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, The Case Against the Death Penalty, 
https://www.aclu.org/case-against-death-penalty. It should be noted that the United States has 
consistently refrained from binding and non-binding international condemnations of the death 
penalty, relying upon the “persistent objector” rule as nullifying any evolving customary interna-
tional law prohibiting the death penalty from applying to the United States.  Beyond the scope of 
this article is the issue of what effect the “persistent objector” rule has on customary international 
law, if such a rule even exists. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, 
and the Utility of Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 221 (2010); Jon-
athan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International 
Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B OF INT’L L. 1 (1986). 
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opportunity to speak with their consular representatives.198 In 2004, lo-
cal and state authorities failed to carry out this obligation by not in-
forming 51 Mexican nationals of this right, ultimately leading to an ex-
ecutive order calling on the states to comply with an ICJ decision as a 
matter of “comity” from President Bush and a case brought by Texas 
before the Supreme Court to establish its legal right to proceed with 
executions.199 All 51 of these individuals were sentenced to death.200 The 
International Court of Justice held that the states were in violation of 
the treaty and should “review and reconsider” the cases,201 but Texas 
refused to honor this judgment and indicated its intention to execute 
15 death row inmates.202 In Medellin v. Texas, Medellín being one of the 
51 Mexicans in Avena, the Supreme Court held that the ICJ’s decision 
was not self-executing and as such was not enforceable as domestic 
law.203 Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, finding that the treaty, and thus 
the judgment of the ICJ in Avena, was self-executing and enforceable 
against the states including Texas.204 
The availability of the death penalty in the United States has led to 
difficulties in seeking extradition from countries without the death pen-
alty, particularly in Western Europe. In 1986, the United States sought 
extradition of German national Jens Soering, an 18-year-old student at 
the University of Virginia charged with killing his girlfriend’s parents, 
from the United Kingdom, which refused to do so unless there were 
assurances that the death penalty not be imposed or carried out.205 Soe-
ring filed a petition seeking to have the European Court of Human 
Rights declare that he could not be extradited to the U.S., as it would 
violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights pro-
hibiting inhuman or degrading treatment.206 The Court agreed that ex-
tradition violated Article 3, due to a “real risk” of Soering being exe-
cuted in Virginia despite the United States’ assurances to the contrary 
and the “death row phenomenon” (essentially the conditions inherent 
 
 198. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261. 
 199. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 197. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals, (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 
I.C.J. Rep. 128, ¶ 106 (Mar. 31). See generally, Malone supra note 182, at 407−09. 
 202. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 197. 
 203. 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008). 
 204. Id. at 538–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 205. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 444 (1989). 
 206. Id. at 463. 
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in being on death row).207 The result is that the U.S.  must seek assur-
ances from the state that the death penalty will not be imposed before 
seeking extradition, with the state making the decision whether to insist 
on the death penalty at the expense of no extradition, whatever inter-
ests the U.S. might have in obtaining extradition of any individual. 
In addition, the United States has signed the United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.208 Given the unequal administration of the 
death penalty in terms of race in the United States, it has been argued 
that the United States is in violation of this treaty.209 The Convention 
also prohibits the intentional imposition of physical or psychological 
abuse against people who are being detained.210 Given the long delays 
between entry of a death sentence and executions during which in-
mates on death row are kept in solitary confinement as well as the tor-
ment that the appeals process often causes, in which a prisoner might 
on multiple occasions have an execution date set only to have it de-
layed, it can be argued that the United States is imposing psychological 
abuse.211 In several cases the European Court of Human Rights found 
that prolonged solitary confinement is torture under Article 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.212 Furthermore, execution by 
any means could be construed as physical abuse under international 
norms, since errors leading to prolonged deaths are not uncommon.213 
It is not surprising that Justice Breyer would lead the way in refer-
encing international laws and practices in calling for abolition of the 
 
 207. Id. at 478. 
 208.  United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter United Nations Conven-
tion]. 
 209. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 197. 
 210. United Nations Convention art. 1–2, supra note 208, at 113–14. 
 211. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 197; see also Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 
2765 (2015). 
 212.  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Factsheet-Detention Conditions and Treatment 
of Prisoners, www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Detention_conditions_ENG.pdf. A California 
district court held that California’s death penalty review system was so subject to delays and ar-
bitrariness that that system itself was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Jones v. Chappell, 31 
F. Supp. 1050, 1062–63 (C.D. Cal. 2014). A year later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed 
on the grounds that the issue was too novel to be raised on federal habeas review under Teague 
v. Lane. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 213. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 197. It may also be that the only way in which 
any lethal injection is administered may cause unnecessary pain and suffering. See Bucklew v. 
Lombardi, 565 Fed. App’x 562, 564–65 (8th Cir. 2014) vacated on reh’g en banc (staying an exe-
cution due to unrebutted medical evidence demonstrating a sufficient likelihood of unnecessary 
pain and suffering due to his vascular illness). 
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death penalty. Financial records have revealed that he was the most 
well-traveled Justice internationally in 2013 and 2014,214 and in 2013 he 
was inducted into France’s Académie des Sciences Morales et Poli-
tiques.215 What is overlooked is how the current Justices exemplify the 
global realities themselves in various ways, traveling internationally on 
a regular basis, having immigrant parents, studying abroad and teaching 
abroad. Indeed, as noted earlier, the impetus for Glossip v. Gross was 
the refusal of foreign companies to provide sodium thiopental or pen-
tobarbital for executions in the United States.216 
III.  MAKING THE CASE FOR SUPREME COURT ABOLITION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY, SOONER RATHER THAN LATER 
Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer in his dissent in Glossip v. 
Gross. It would be easy to include her vote against the death penalty 
and move on as being simply one more vote, but the significance of her 
joining in the dissent has broader implications for the decisions of the 
remaining members of the Court. Justice Ginsburg is not one to call for 
such a bold transition lightly. Despite her pop culture characterization 
as the “Notorious RBG” in part for her staunch advocacy of women’s 
rights,217 she is a cautious, incremental advocate. In an editorial by Irin 
Carmon, she is quoted as advising young women, “My advice is fight 
for the things that you care about. . . . Fair enough—banal enough really 
. . . . But do it in a way that will lead others to join you.”218 The editorial 
goes on to quote an ACLU colleague in her confirmation hearing: 
“‘Present the court with the next logical step,’ she urged us, and then 
the next and then the next. ‘Don’t ask them to go too fast, or you’ll lose 
what you might have won.’”219 
Abolishing the death penalty, then, is the next logical step for the 
Court. Just a few weeks after Glossip, Justice Ginsburg spoke about it 
and other prominent cases from the term to an audience of Duke 
alumni and students at the D.C. Summer Institute on Law and Policy.220 
 
 214. Bill Mears, Justices’ Finances Show Overseas Travel, Book Royalties, Gifts, CNN, (June 
20, 2012) http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/20/us/scotus-justices-finances. 
 215. Adam Liptak, Breyer Sees Value in a Global View of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2015, at 
A20. 
 216. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2733–34 (2015). 
 217.  See generally IRIN CARMON & SHANA KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF RUTH BADER GINSBURG (Dey Street Books 2015). 
 218.  Irin Carmon, Justice Ginsburg’s Cautious Radicalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2015, at SR3. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Justice Ginsburg Discusses Ruling and Groundbreaking Advocacy, 34 DUKE L. MAG. 6, 
(2015) https://law.duke.edu/news/pdf/lawmagfall15.pdf. 
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When asked why she and Justice Breyer had called for a review of the 
death penalty’s constitutionality, she said: “Justice Breyer was speaking 
on the basis of his experience for 21 years, what he had seen in the 
Court’s effort to create a capital punishment that could be adminis-
tered with an even hand, and he concluded for reasons that he set out 
at length that it couldn’t be achieved. . . . ”221 
And so did she. Thus, two of the Justices with the most experience 
on the Court (only Justice Kennedy having more) have concluded that 
the death penalty is a failed experiment under Gregg.222 In that same 
conversation, Justice Ginsburg went on to emphasize her admiration 
for how Justice Thurgood Marshall as a civil rights advocate and step-
by-incremental-step chipped away at racially discriminatory provisions 
until none could be left standing. She acknowledged keeping in her of-
fice Justice Marshall’s volume of the opinions he had written which had 
not been accepted by a majority of the Court.223 Her vote in Glossip 
cannot be dismissed, on or off the Court, as a “liberal” vote. The signif-
icance of her vote also would not be lost on Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan. 
Again, it would be simplistic to count the votes of these latter two 
Justices as potential “liberal” votes against the death penalty. Indeed, 
they dissented separately from Justice Breyer in Glossip, but no less 
rigorously in their analysis. Finding that the Court’s determination that 
midazolam poses on objectively intolerable risk of severe pain is “fac-
tually wrong,”224 these dissenters (also joined by Justices Breyer and 
Ginsburg) reserved their most forceful objection to the majority’s in-
terpretation of the plurality opinion in Baze v. Rees225: 
“By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth 
Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the 
dignity of all persons.” Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 . . . (2005). 
Today, however, the Court absolves the State of Oklahoma of this 
duty. It does so by misconstruing and ignoring the record evidence 
 
 221.  Id. at 7. 
 222.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 223.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address at the Duke D.C. Summer Institute on Law and 
Policy (July 29, 2015). 
 224.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2792 (2015). The use of midazolam gathered public 
attention in what is generally characterized as the botched execution of Clayton Lockett in Okla-
homa in 2014. During the execution he gasped and writhed on the gurney, a vein collapsed, and 
he suffered a heart attack. It was reported that he grimaced and tensed his body several times 
before the execution was shielded from the press. After being declared unconscious, he spoke 
inaudibly twice and the said the word “man.” See Blow, supra note 19.  
 225.  553 U.S 35 (2008). 
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regarding the constitutional insufficiency of midazolam as a sedative 
in a three-drug lethal injection cocktail, and by imposing a wholly 
unprecedented obligation on the condemned inmate to identify an 
available means for his or her own execution. The contortions nec-
essary to save this particular lethal injection protocol are not worth 
the price.226 
The recent so-called “liberal” term of the Court has been attributed 
to splintering opinions of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito 
even with agreed outcomes and the leadership of Justice Ginsburg.227 
Justice Kennedy voted with the liberals (Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and 
Sotomayor) eight times and the other Justices five times (compared to 
leaning to the right two-thirds of the time in previous terms) in the thir-
teen cases this past term decided by a five to four vote.228 
Close scrutiny of the recent Supreme Court decisions on the death 
penalty and the assignment of those opinions reveals another signifi-
cant factor for future death penalty jurisprudence. Since 1989, Justice 
Kennedy has written all of the majority opinions limiting the death 
penalty except for two decisions, Brumfield229 and Miller230, as noted 
above.231 Justice Kennedy, as senior Justice in those majorities, assigned 
those opinions to the most junior Justices who wrote opinions accepted 
by all of the majority. In Miller, Justice Breyer wrote a short concurring 
opinion, which begins with, “I join the Court’s opinion in full.”232 In 
Glossip, Chief Justice Roberts assigned the majority opinion not to 
Scalia, Thomas or even Kennedy, but to Justice Alito.233 Justice Scalia 
joined the opinion in one phrase, and dedicated the rest of his opinion 
to addressing Justice Breyer’s dissent.234 Justice Thomas, however, 
joined the majority opinion using a different test than that posed by 
Justice Alito, which rejected the reasoning of Baze by suggesting that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits only methods of execution “deliber-
ately designed to inflict pain,” citing his concurrence in the Baze judg-
ment only.235 The remainder of his opinion (and part of Justice Scalia’s) 
 
 226.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2797 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 227.  Adam Liptak, Right Divided, Disciplined Left Steered Justices, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2015, 
at A1 (quoting from an interview of Justice Ginsburg who stated, “We have made a concerted 
effort to speak with one voice in important cases . . . .”). 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015). 
 230.  Miller v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 231.  See supra notes 76–95 and accompanying text. 
 232.  Miller, at 2475. 
 233.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015). 
 234.  Id. at 2746 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 235.  Id. at 2750 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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attacking the empirical evidence employed by Justice Breyer, echoes, 
as John Donohue points out in this issue, the Justice Stevens/Justice 
Scalia debate over the relevance of empirical data in Baze.236 
Justice Kennedy is notably silent beyond joining in the opinion. On 
a normative level, the majority opinion offers two reasons for affirming 
the Court of Appeals decision denying the prisoners’ application for a 
preliminary injunction against execution: 
First, the prisoners failed to identify a known and available alterna-
tive method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a require-
ment all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims. See Baze 
v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008) (plurality opinion). Second, the Dis-
trict Court did not commit clear error when it found that the pris-
oners failed to establish that Oklahoma’s use of a massive dose of 
midazolam in its execution protocol entails a substantial risk of se-
vere pain.237 
Nothing in Justice Kennedy’s joinder in this opinion poses any an-
alytical inconsistency, much less barrier, to his joining in an opinion that 
the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment. Nor is it necessary 
to overrule Baze to find the death penalty categorically violates the 
Amendment. To obtain any preliminary injunction, the petitioners 
must establish a likelihood of success on the merits.238 The plurality 
opinion in Baze provided so little guidance as to the constitutional lim-
its on methods of execution that no outcome on the merits might be 
deemed “likely.” With respect to this specific method of execution, the 
district court did not commit clear error in its factual determination 
that the evidence failed to establish that the protocol entailed a sub-
stantial risk of severe pain according to the majority. 239 Procedurally, 
Glossip on its facts failed to meet the standard for a preliminary injunc-
tion or to provide the necessary evidentiary basis as to pain inflicted by 
the protocol.240 
The only significant normative precedent of the Glossip majority 
opinion is the imposition of a requirement on prisoners to identify a 
 
 236.  Id. at 2751–53; Id. at 2747–48 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also John Donohue, Empirical 
Analysis and the Fate of Capital Punishment, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L & PUB. POL’Y STARTPAGE#, 
PINCITE (2016). 
 237.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (majority opinion). 
 238.  Id. at 2736–37 (citing Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). 
 239.  Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). 
 240.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2792 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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“known and available alternative method of execution.”241 It is this pur-
ported requirement, supported only by a “see” citation to the plurality 
opinion in Baze,242 that triggered the dissenting opinion of Justice So-
tomayor, joined by Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg and which ne-
cessitated the footnote in Justice Alito’s opinion defining the holding 
in Baze (given that only Justices Kennedy and Alito joined in the rea-
soning of the Chief Justice’s opinion in Baze).243 
Beyond procedural hurdles and searching for some common thread 
in a fractured Court decision, Baze is a very slender reed on which to 
find a method of execution (which Justice Sotomayor twice calls “the 
chemical equivalent of burning alive”244) or the death penalty, to be suf-
ficiently humane under the Eighth Amendment.245 Justices Alito, 
Scalia, and Thomas dismiss years of credible empirical evidence on the 
discriminatory and otherwise arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, 
yet require of prisoner-petitioners in Glossip to advance clear evidence 
medically and scientifically that a method of execution imposes a se-
vere level of pain.246 
IV.  WHY ABOLITION BY THE SUPREME COURT AND WHY NOW 
Justice Breyer’s invitation for a categorical death penalty challenge 
before the Court has ignited a discussion as to when and how such a 
challenge might be brought.247 It has been suggested that veteran liti-
gators favor an incremental, more cautious strategy, challenging the 
penalty’s implementation in the courts (for example, seeking a categor-
ical exclusion for execution of the mentally ill) and seeking state-by-
 
 241.  Id. at 2731 (majority opinion). 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  See id. at 2738 n.2 (“Justice Sotomayor’s dissent . . . inexplicably refuses to recognize 
that the Chief Justice’s opinion in Baze sets out the holding of the case. In Baze, the opinion of 
the Chief Justice was joined by two other Justices. Justices Scalia and Thomas took the broader 
position that a method of execution is consistent with the Eighth Amendment unless it is deliber-
ately designed to inflict pain. Thus, as explained in Marks v. United States, . . . the Chief Justice’s 
opinion sets out the holding of the case. It is for this reason that petitioners base their argument 
on the rule set out in that opinion.” (citations omitted)).  
The analysis of the dissent that Baze did not hold as Justice Scalia contends in the case itself or 
under Marks is at Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2793–94 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 244.  Id. at 2793, 2795 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 245.  Id. at. 2796. 
 246.  Id. at 2728 (majority opinion); id. at 2747–48 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2751–52 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 247.  See Adam Liptak, Death Penalty Foes Torn on When to Press Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2015, at A1. 
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state legislation, with younger lawyers seeking an immediate nation-
wide decision from the Court.248 Even assuming that is the case, there 
is a veteran litigator on the Court known for her incremental and cau-
tious approach who has now gone on record for a challenge to be 
brought now.249 
There are cases in the pipeline that can be utilized.250 It would not 
be difficult to find a mentally ill petitioner to challenge both execution 
of the mentally ill and the death penalty generally as cruel and unusual 
punishment.251 The likelihood of every death penalty case to come be-
fore the Court containing a general Eighth Amendment challenge if 
possible procedurally is a virtual professional prerequisite after 
Breyer’s and Ginsburg’s invitation to counsel to do so. On May 31, 
2016, the Court denied certiorari in Tucker v. Louisiana, in which the 
defendant’s counsel echoed Breyer’s dissent. Tucker barely qualified 
for the death penalty imposed as he was 18 at the time of the killing 
and had an I.Q. of 74. Moreover, he was sentenced in Caddo Parish, 
which imposes more death sentences per capita than any other parish 
or county in the United States.252 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dis-
sented from the denial of certiorari, with Breyer in his dissent suggest-
ing that the sentence was the arbitrary result of the county in which he 
committed the crime.253 The denial of certiorari itself was in keeping 
with the Court’s avoidance of deciding the remaining high profile in the 
Court’s term during the vacancy, and hardly surprising or inauspicious 
 
 248. Id. 
 249.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2755. 
 250.  See e.g., Ex parte Murphy, No. WR-38,198-03, 2014 WL 6462841 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 
19, 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Murphy v. Texas, 135 S. Ct. 2350 (May 26, 2015). Julius Murphy 
was sentenced to death for robbing and killing a stranded motorist in Texas. One of his lawyers is 
Neal Katyal, an experienced Supreme Court litigator and former Acting Solicitor General of the 
United States (and former law clerk to Justice Breyer). The brief to the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals included a general challenge to the death penalty. Application for Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus at 43, Ex parte Murphy, No. WR-38,198-03, 2014 WL 6462841 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 19, 
2014), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1Lfr8Iqz_7a2tkSW1VSjI4ekE/view. See also Liptak, su-
pra note 247. His petition for certiorari on procedural issues related to intellectual disability was 
denied on May 26, 2015. Murphy v. Texas, 135 S. Ct. 2350 (May 26, 2015).  
The attorneys for Dylann Roof, the man accused of killing nine black church members in a 
Charleston, South Carolina church in 2015, have filed a motion challenging the death penalty 
after federal prosecutors declined Roof’s offer to serve life without parole, citing Justice Breyer’s 
dissent in Glossip. 
 251.  See id. 
 252.  See generally Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rules in Capital Cases, overturning an Ari-
zona Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2016, at A10. 
 253.  Tucker v. Louisiana, No. 15-947 (May 31, 2016), 578 U.S.___(2016). 
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for similar challenges for that reason. It is significant, however, that Jus-
tice Breyer chose to renew his position in Glossip in a written dissent 
from a denial of certiorari. 
There is another casualty of the death penalty, and that is the public 
perception of the integrity of the Supreme Court. Linda Greenhouse, 
Pulitzer Prize winning journalist for her coverage of the Supreme 
Court, exposed the “death trap” of the Supreme Court in connection 
to Glossip and other cases and its impact on public perception of the 
objectivity of the Court. 254 Furthermore, Adam Liptak, the Supreme 
Court respondent for the New York Times, discussed a death row peti-
tioner, Charles F. Warner, who brought a challenge to Oklahoma’s le-
thal-injection protocol, and sought a stay of his execution.255 Over four 
dissenting votes, the stay was denied and Oklahoma executed the pris-
oner within hours.256 A week later, three identically situated prisoners 
brought Glossip, and were granted a stay of execution through a stay 
of the lower court decision when the Court took their petition.257 It 
takes five Justices to grant a stay, but only four to hear a case, a life-
and-death procedural difference.258 It is not the only instance in which 
a stay of execution has come and gone without explanation.259 Green-
house’s final paragraph is prescient: 
In 2008, two years before he retired, Justice John Paul Stevens re-
nounced the death penalty. His nuanced opinion in Baze v. Rees re-
wards rereading. No current justice has taken up the call. I’m not so 
naïve as to predict that a majority of the Supreme Court will declare 
the death penalty unconstitutional anytime soon. But the voice of 
even one member of the court could set a clarifying marker to which 
others would have to respond. And it just might over time point the 
way to freeing the court—and the rest of us—from the machinery 
of death.260 
Two months later, Justice Breyer would issue his dissent in Glossip. 
One year later, this author is hopeful enough (or naïve enough to those 
who disagree) that a challenge can be mounted now before many more 
 
 254.  Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court’s Death Trap, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 2015, at A23. 
 255.  Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Case Over Drugs Used in Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2015, at A1. 
 256.  Id.; see also Lance Rogers, Oklahoma Executes Man Using New Protocol after Justices 
Deny Eleventh-Hour Stay, 83 U.S.L.W. 1048 (Jan. 20, 2015). 
 257.  Greenhouse, supra note 254. 
 258. Id.  
 259.  Id.; see also William Baude, The Supreme Court’s Secret Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2015, at A23. 
 260.  Greenhouse, supra note 254. 
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executions occur. 
As this article was being presented, Justice Scalia died, leaving a 
vacancy on the Court which immediately flared into partisan politics.261 
The thrust of this article was that a Court with Justice Scalia might al-
ready be prepared to find the death penalty unconstitutional. Whatever 
the political bent, perceived or actual, of a Supreme Court nominee, it 
would be unusual for that inclination to be coupled with the level of 
skepticism toward empirical evidence of Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
This conclusion of possible if not probable abolition remains the same 
even if a newly elected Republican president were to appoint a Scalia-
equivalent justice to the Court. The vacancy on the Court could be an 
opportunity to restore the image of thoughtful justice to the Court, an 
opportunity that may already have been lost but not irretrievably. No 
single issue, pro or con, should be a political litmus test for appointment 
to the Court if the Court is to rise above the partisan polarization of 
the other branches. Having left the New York Times after three decades 
to join academia, Linda Greenhouse is open about the need for “re-
setting the post-Scalia Court.”262 As Justice Scalia’s opinions became 
more vitriolic the Court seemed to reflect the harsh and often disgrace-
ful rhetoric of the Presidential primaries. In her editorial, Greenhouse 
refers to an article by law Professor Neal Devins and political science 
professor Lawrence Baum, that explores how party polarization may 
have infected the Court’s objectivity and at the least damaged the pub-
lic’s perception of its objectivity.263 Hopefully, political liberals and con-
servatives will recognize this need, at some point in the future 
acknowledge that it is not unprecedented for a President to appoint a 
Supreme Court Justice in an election year, and reinstate judicial 
thoughtfulness and integrity as the goal, not “stacking” the Court. 
  
 
 261.  Russell Berman, A Death that Reshapes U.S. Politics, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/antonin-scalia-death-politics-senate-2016-
campaign-obama/462738.  
 262.  Linda Greenhouse, Resetting the Post-Scalia Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2016, 
at A25. Conversely, if party politics continues to predominate, the urgency of a challenge to the 
death penalty to this Court, even with a new appointee, is preferable to having such a critical issue 
determined by a post-election Court perceived as either strongly “liberal” or “conservative” 
based on a number of appointments being made due to retirements of senior justices in a single 
Presidential term. 
 263.  See id. (referring to forthcoming law review article, Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, 
Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court (Wm. & 
Mary L. School Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-276, Mar. 16, 2016) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2432111). 
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The final words are those of Justice Breyer: 
In interpreting these open (constitutional) phrases, a judge may in 
part have to face the fact that he cannot jump out of his own skin, 
he cannot escape his own background, and he is guided by a highly 
general jurisprudential philosophy that he will likely have accepted 
over the course of many professional years. I went to public schools 
in San Francisco; I grew up during the 1950s; I am inevitably the 
lawyer that I am. That means in respect to views about the nature of 
the Constitution or of law, their relation to the people of the United 
States, and the way in which law affects people, I cannot escape my 
own general views. Law is not computer science, and those views 
matter. That is why it is a good thing, in a country as diverse as ours, 
with well over three hundred million people, that different judges 
have different general jurisprudential views. I should add that 
judges serve long terms, but over time different presidents will ap-
point different judges with different highly general jurisprudential 
views. The Court can change its nature very slowly over time. And 
in a few cases it can reflect, in a highly abstract general sense, the 
nature of the country.264 
The present political fracas over whether Judge Garland265 is even 
going to get a confirmation hearing before the election admittedly does 
not bode well for Congress to demonstrate a renewed respect for a Su-
preme Court above the political fray. “Liberal” or “conservative” labels 
do not reflect in any meaningful way on evaluating Judge Garland’s 
record or on the actual precedent for Senate hearings and action on 
Supreme Court nominees during an election year (most notably and 
recently Justice Kennedy himself). The standard argument against hav-
ing the Court decide cases involving substantial change in a societal 
norm—that such decisions are best left to the state legislatures as ex-
pressing the will of the people—simply has no applicability in the con-
text of a death penalty with all of its societal and human costs imposed 
in only a handful of counties in a handful of states, which might not 
come around to the general state consensus in practice for any number 
of years. The will of the people in such circumstances is held captive to 
a localized veto which does not reflect a national consensus but frus-
trates it, at tremendous expense in human life and public perception of 
 
 264.  BREYER, supra note 176, at 277–78. 
 265.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Judge Garland is best known as a centrist 
jurist with a “meticulous work ethic” and who favors an “adherence to legal principles” rather 
than a strong ideological bent. Michael D. Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Su-
preme Court, N.Y. TIMES (March 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/poli-
tics/obama-supreme-court-nominee.html. 
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the integrity of the legal system. The empirical evidence that the death 
penalty is imposed in only a few states,266 and in only a few counties of 
those states,267 demonstrates that the national consensus has shifted268 
even should such methodology predominate over the prevailing meth-
odology, as exemplified by the Kennedy case, in which the Court deter-
mines what punishment reflects “evolving standards of decency.”269 
  
 
 266.  See John Donohue, Empirical Analysis and the Fate of Capital Punishment, 11 DUKE J. 
CONST. L & PUB. POL’Y 52 (2016); Frank Baumgartner, The Geographic Distribution of US Exe-
cution, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2016). 
 267. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Lindsey S. Vann, Forty Years of Death: The Past, and Future 
of the Death Penalty in South Carolina (or Still Arbitrary after All These Years, 11 DUKE J. CONST. 
L & PUB. POL’Y 183 (2016). 
 268. See, e.g., State v. Peeler, 318 Conn. __(2016) (reaffirming that Court’s earlier opinion in 
State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1(2015), following legislative abolition of the death penalty). Santiago 
held that the death penalty violates the state constitutional provision against cruel and unusual 
punishment, applying retroactively prior to the legislative abolition. See also Erik Eckholm, Del-
aware Supreme Court Ruling Could Deal State’s Death Penalty A Final Blow, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 
3, 2016, at A11. 
 269. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court continues to struggle with ongoing issues which exem-
plify how the death penalty fails to comply with “evolving standards of decency.” On June 6, 2016, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the upcoming terms concerning the impacts of race, 
intellectual disability, and incompetent counsel in the imposition of the death penalty. In one case 
the prosecutor and the defendant’s own expert witness stated that black defendants were more 
likely to be dangerous than white defendants. In the other the Court agreed to hear the appeal of 
a defendant with an intellectual disability who has been on death row for 36 years. In its initial 
announcement the Court said it would hear both the appeal on the standard used for intellectual 
disability and also whether 36 years on death row itself constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 
Two hours later the Court issued a revised order limiting review to the disability standard. Adam 
Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2016, at A11. A chart 
of the categorical exclusions follows. 
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APPENDIX 
CATEGORICAL EXCLUSIONS FROM THE DEATH PENALTY 
Gregg v. Georgia (1976) (ending the Furman v. Georgia morato 
rium) 
  Coker v. Georgia (1977) (rape of an adult) 
     Enmund v. Florida (1982) (felony-murder without sharing in  
      the homicidal act or intent) 
        Atkins v. Virginia (2002) (“mentally retarded”) 
          Roper v. Simmons (2005) (juveniles)* 
            Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) (rape of child without intent               
             to kill or resulting in death) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Graham v. Florida (2010) (no life without parole for juveniles for  
 non-homicidal offenses 
      Miller v. Alabama (2012) (no life without parole for juveniles  
      for any offense) 
            Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) (Miller v. Alabama retro 
             active) 
 
